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This article examines the abatement in greenhouse gas emissions 
achievable in Papua New Guinea by a reduction in deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD) and its opportunity costs. The 
total abatement achieved by the cessation of logging for export 
in 2012 is estimated at between 658 and 788 million tonnes (Mt) 
of carbon dioxide, at an opportunity cost nationally of between 
US$3.40 and US$5.64/t. Abatement achieved by the cessation 
of new oil-palm establishment totals between 45 and 113 Mt, 
at a national cost of about US$40/t. Stakeholder opportunity 
costs, as well as national costs, are estimated for logging and oil-
palm. Recent work that quantifies emissions from deforestation 
in Papua New Guinea is integrated with the author’s financial 
models for the logging and palm-oil industries. A fuller 
understanding is achieved of the complexity of designing and 
implementing policies for REDD.
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The aim of this article is to estimate the 
opportunity costs, and hence the compensa-
tion, to stakeholders in Papua New Guinea 
of ceasing or reducing the level of exports 
of raw logs and of ceasing or reducing the 
establishment of new oil-palm plantations 
in favour of reduction in deforestation and 
degradation (REDD).
Filer et al. (2009) estimate that approxi-
mately 293,000 sq km of Papua New 
Guinea’s tropical forests are open to logging 
and conversion to agriculture and thereby 
are a possible source of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, however, 
omits REDD from the suite of mitigation 
activities that attracts credits under the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
even though deforestation was thought 
responsible for about 17 per cent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions (Canadell et al. 
2007; Houghton 2003, 2005) (this estimate 
has now been revised downwards).1 There 
was heightened interest in the role that 
REDD could play after Stern (2006) reported 
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that compensating for returns from logging 
and agriculture could abate emissions at 
relatively low cost; this notion was rein-
forced in the case of Papua New Guinea by 
Howes (2009).
Much effort and speculation followed 
on how REDD might be included in post-
Kyoto arrangements for climate change 
mitigation under both market and funds 
approaches. Meanwhile, however, the 
major emitters—with the exception of the 
European Union—failed to adopt national 
emission targets and abatement schemes. 
As a consequence, the Copenhagen climate 
change conference in December 2009 was 
unable to deliver a new protocol to man-
date the cuts in emissions that would have 
stimulated the necessary investment needed 
for REDD credits to enter the global market. 
The consequential lack of a global market 
for carbon emissions has stifled the market 
for REDD credits and the development of a 
REDD carbon-accounting system.
While the Copenhagen conference 
failed to deliver a market mechanism for 
REDD credits, the Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC 2009:Clause 5) nevertheless 
agreed on the need for positive incentives 
for REDD-plus through a funds approach,2 
enabled by the mobilisation of financial 
resources from industrialised countries. 
REDD schemes are limited to deals between 
forested developing countries and bilateral 
or multilateral donors, with payments 
for carbon emissions abated based not on 
market prices but on what the opportunity 
costs of abatement might be.
The Copenhagen Accord contains a 
collective commitment by industrialised 
countries to provide additional resources for 
climate change adaptation and mitigation 
in developing countries, including forestry, 
approaching US$30 billion for 2010–12 
and rising to US$100 billion a year by 2020 
(UNFCCC 2009:Clause 8). At the same time, 
Australia, the United States, France, Japan, 
Norway and the United Kingdom pledged 
US$3.5 billion to support immediate steps to 
implement the accord (Reuters 2009).
This article focuses on clarifying the 
costs of REDD to Papua New Guinea and 
to potential investors. It also reviews some 
of the key policy issues surrounding the 
deployment of compensation funds.
Sources of emissions from land-
use change in Papua New Guinea
While Papua New Guinea has taken a 
national approach to the reduction of 
emissions—citing transport, power gen-
eration, mining and fire as areas where 
mitigation actions can be taken (Conrad 
2010:4)—the country is already a low-carbon 
economy. The abovementioned sectors 
provide very limited opportunities for 
abatement. For example, the latest World 
Resources Institute (WRI 2010) estimates 
suggest that less than 10 per cent of Papua 
New Guinea’s emissions are generated by 
activities other than land-use change and 
forestry (LUCF).
The major causes of deforestation in 
Papua New Guinea are commercial agricul-
ture (both estate and smallholder), logging 
and subsistence or shifting agriculture. In 
the case of logging and subsistence agri-
culture, the forest re-grows. The secondary 
forests that regenerate after logging may or 
may not be revisited by the logging com-
panies that hold concessions over the area. 
The secondary forest that follows shifting 
agriculture will be cleared again, with the 
length of the fallow interval depending on, 
among other things, population pressure 
(Bourke and Harwood 2009).
Shearman et al. (2009:19) estimated that 
deforestation and degradation released 
between 146 and 269 million-tonnes (Mt) 
of carbon dioxide in 2007—32 per cent of 
which was the result of large-scale logging. 
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These calculations are, however, overesti-
mates because they ignore the capacity of 
regenerating forest to reabsorb the carbon 
dioxide released by deforestation (PNGFIA 
2008).
Almost all of Papua New Guinea’s land 
and forests are under customary ownership, 
and the bulk of the population still depends 
for its livelihood on indigenous farming 
systems (Allen et al. 2001). Shearman et al. 
ert that subsistence agriculture is a major 
driver of deforestation. Filer et al (2009), 
however, challenge the assumption that 
areas impacted by harvesting or shifting 
cultivation will inevitably degrade and 
become non-forest, because it is not sup-
ported by observation of cut-over forest 
in Papua New Guinea. It is erroneous to 
assume that both logging and subsistence 
agriculture lead to permanent deforesta-
tion. While there is a loss of carbon from 
newly logged concessions, plus that from 
previously logged-over areas and from new 
village gardens being created, there is a 
simultaneous and countervailing sequestra-
tion of carbon on most of the area previously 
used (Filer et al. 2009; Keenan et al. 2005). 
Filer et al. (2009) conclude that the rate of 
deforestation is much lower than suggested 
by Shearman et al. (2009).
The government has little or no capacity 
to change local farming practices, which are 
characterised by a high degree of innova-
tion, enabling food supply to keep pace 
with a growing population in most locations 
(Bourke and Harwood 2009; Filer et al. 2009). 
Therefore, it is not profitable to speculate on 
the reduction in carbon emissions that might 
take place from changes in cultural practices 
in subsistence or smallholder agriculture. 
Production of oil-palm, cocoa, coffee and 
rubber by smallholders has been growing 
over the past two decades, while estate 
agriculture has been contracting, except 
for oil-palm and tea; but, again, there is no 
comprehensive information on the impacts 
of these trends on the carbon cycle. It has 
been concluded (Filer et al. 2009) that 
selective logging is the only area in which 
deforestation can be readily avoided.
The carbon content of Papua New 
Guinea’s tropical native forests has for the 
first time been the subject of a robust assess-
ment of the aboveground carbon stocks. Fox 
et al. (2010) discuss the measurement of the 
carbon in primary forests and in the regener-
ating forests of different ages at sites across 
Papua New Guinea, and draw on the work 
of Bryan et al.  (forthcoming), in Fox, Yosi 
and Keenan (2010:5), to estimate the above-
ground carbon in lower mountain forests in 
Papua New Guinea at 137 t of carbon per 
hectare (C/ha) and in selectively logged 
forest at 62 t C/ha.3 This model accounts 
for the net emissions from selective logging4 
from 1961 onwards. In the case of oil-palm 
establishment, Fox et al.  (2010) model the 
historical and future emissions from clear-
ing secondary forest and the absorption of 
carbon by oil-palm plantations.
Abatement alternatives in PNG 
forestry
While this article focuses on the cessation of 
logging, the feasibility of the enhancement 
of carbon stock recovery in logged areas 
through post-harvest reforestation and 
through reduced-impact logging needs to be 
discussed, as both activities qualify under 
REDD-plus.
Logging creates large gaps in the 
forest canopy, encouraging the growth of 
low-value pioneer tree species and shrubs. 
These gaps can be filled with transplants 
of desirable species—an activity termed 
enrichment planting or ‘reforestation 
naturally’. Rehabilitation of logged-
over areas should enhance the value of 
regenerating forest, making a second cut 
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by loggers more economical and more 
likely. Enrichment planting is, however, 
hard to justify economically and has not 
been successful in Papua New Guinea, even 
though levies have been collected for that 
purpose. Moreover, such rehabilitation might 
not increase the sequestration rate of carbon 
by the forest, given that pioneer species are 
faster growing than desirable species. And 
if rehabilitation enables a second cut then 
the carbon loss and environmental losses 
incurred are increased.
Selective harvesting generates large 
quantities of decomposing biomass, includ-
ing tree crowns, non-merchantable forest 
and adjacent trees killed, and was found 
to release 75 t C/ha (Fox, Yosi and Keenan 
2010). It is generally recognised that the 
most effective way to reduce emissions and 
enhance regeneration is to plan and control 
the harvesting process. Logging companies, 
however, see no benefit in reducing collat-
eral damage; the evidence is that adherence 
to the Logging Code of Practice (PNGFA 
1995) has been very patchy (Hunt 2002a).
Payments to logging companies for 
reducing their carbon emissions through 
low-impact logging would need to be rela-
tive to emissions under the Logging Code 
of Practice, rather than against emissions 
under present practice, otherwise moral 
hazard is an issue. Estimating the abatement 
achieved in this way is likely to be techni-
cally difficult and high cost.
Aims and methods
In a post-Kyoto protocol that includes a 
market for REDD credits, the method of 
carbon accounting and the baseline against 
which to measure abated emissions will 
need to be agreed upon. Deforestation is 
already accounted for under the Kyoto 
Protocol for Annex I countries. Where 
deforestation was a net source of emissions 
in 1990, the deforestation in the first com-
mitment period—2008–12—is measured 
against the 1990 level. This is termed 
‘net–net’ accounting. In applying REDD to 
developing countries, the same net–net prin-
ciple could apply. One of the major obstacles 
to the inclusion of deforestation in the CDM 
was the problem of lack of certainty about 
how much deforestation has been avoided. 
Baselines are a tool to assess performance 
in REDD and to determine target levels 
that go beyond what would have been 
achieved. Deforestation rates could already 
be declining in a country and could go on 
declining as the areas of forest available for 
profitable agriculture decline. There is a risk 
in this situation that the baseline will be set 
too high and REDD will be rewarded for 
reductions in emissions that would have 
taken place anyway.
The base periods need to be set over 
a period long enough to minimise the 
problems of using remote sensing due to 
cloud cover and inter-annual variation in 
deforestation rates. Given the inter-year 
variability of deforestation within countries, 
the baseline suggested by Mollicone et 
al. (2007) is 1990–2005, with the average 
conversion rate per annum derived from 
the satellite imagery survey at the start 
(1990) and the end (2005) of the period. 
The approach of Mollicone et al. would 
prevent countries from receiving incentives 
when global deforestation rates are above 
the baseline. The net global incentive is 
apportioned among countries according to 
their performance.
In a different approach, by Santilli et 
al. (2005), in heavily logged regions such as 
Kalimantan et al. for example—where much 
of the lowland forest has been removed 
after logging to make way for oil-palm 
plantations—crediting for increases in 
carbon stocks in a commitment period could 
include reforestation or re-growth.
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In the absence of an agreed universal 
method of baseline determination, and the 
reversion to fund-based REDD initiatives, 
the method adopted in this article is to 
assess the abatement achieved by a reduc-
tion in deforestation against emissions 
under business as usual (BAU).
The costing of future emissions abated 
requires the projection of opportunity 
costs. The global financial crisis depressed 
incomes from log exports in 2009, but it is 
assumed that log prices will recover and 
follow earlier trends. In discussions between 
the author and the PNG Forest Industry 
Association (PNGFIA), consensus was 
reached on plausible scenarios for ‘high’, 
‘medium’ and ‘low’ projections. In the case 
of palm-oil, projections of production were 
discussed with the PNG Oil Palm Research 
Association, and the expansion was expected 
to continue, while the expected prices for 
palm-oil are those forecast by the World 
Bank (2009a).
Having estimated the opportunity costs, 
the opportunity costs per tonne of carbon 
dioxide abated can be calculated using Fox, 
Yosi and Keenan’s (2010) data on emissions. 
The method assumes a cessation of logging 
and oil-palm establishment in 2012, but 
it could just as well be used to assess the 
emissions abatement and opportunity costs 
of any degree of partial cessation in logging 
or oil-palm establishment, with the cost per 
tonne of carbon remaining constant. The net 
reduction in emissions in any year is the 
difference between REDD emissions and 
BAU emissions.
In the absence of logging and new oil-
palm plantings, it cannot be assumed that no 
alternative activity would take place. If some 
other activity does occur, what is the difference 
between the economic benefit from this and 
from forestry and palm-oil production? The 
opportunity cost in terms of export income is 
thus derived as Equation 1.
Income with REDD – BAU income = 
Opportunity cost of REDD
(1)
To compare the costs of logging and 
oil-palm, the opportunity costs of REDD 
per tonne of emissions are derived. Setting 
the emission reduction as the denominator 
and the estimates of opportunity costs as 
the numerator allows the derivation of the 
costs per tonne of avoided deforestation 
(Equation 2).
Opportunity cost REDD($)/Emissions reduction 
REDD(t) = Opportunity cost of REDD($/t)
(2)
The discount rate
Cost–benefit analysis of long-term invest-
ments is very sensitive to the social rate of 
discount. There is a case for applying falling 
discount rates over time to avoid very little 
weight being placed on events in the distant 
future (Newell and Pizer 2003; Pearce 2003). 
Stern (2006) tackled the issue of the discount 
rate to be applied to very long-term damage 
from greenhouse emissions, and hence 
the long-term benefits of mitigation. He 
argued for a low discount rate, given the 
risks of experiencing extremely damaging 
phenomena and the likelihood that impacts 
of emissions will accelerate as the stock of 
greenhouse gases increases.
This article, however, deals with income 
and carbon sequestration streams over 
a relatively short time. Hepburn and 
Koundouri (2007) suggest that for short 
time frames there is no difference between 
a constant discount rate and a declining 
discount rate.
The approach to estimating the present 
cost per tonne of emissions abated—one that 
is adapted to irregular flows of carbon—is 
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In these equations, OS = stakeholder 
opportunity costs; T = government log 
export tax receipts; R = landowner royal-
ties; D = landowner development benefits; 
L = logging company profits; EI = export 
income; EIL = log export income oppor-
tunity cost; OCTC = opportunity cost per 
tonne of carbon dioxide abated; n = years 
(in the case of the ‘high’ projection, y = 14; 
in the case of the ‘medium’ projection, y = 
16; and in the case of the ‘low’ projection, y = 
19); CO2 = carbon dioxide emissions abated; 
and r = 0.1.
Estimation of the opportunity 
costs (BAU incomes), of ceasing 
palm-oil establishment from 2012
The present value of opportunity costs in the 
case where oil company profits, smallholder 
profits and government tax receipts are 
forgone, is in Equation 6. The present value 
of costs in the case where palm-oil export 
income is the opportunity cost is in Equa-
tion 7. The present value of opportunity 
costs per tonne of carbon dioxide emitted 
to apply the social discount rate to each 
tonne of carbon captured and divide that 
figure into the present value of opportunity 
costs. Implicit in this discounting approach 
is that the real value of the marginal 
damage caused by a one-tonne increment 
in atmospheric carbon is constant over time 
(Richards and Stokes 2004).
There are uncertainties with respect to 
global markets, climatic factors and PNG 
policies that could affect BAU incomes. In 
the case of emissions abated, there are uncer-
tainties associated with the quality of logs 
extracted, and their carbon content, as log-
ging and oil-palm establishment are forced 
to exploit dwindling areas of merchantable 
forests. Therefore, it was felt justified to 
discount both BAU incomes and the emis-
sions abated at a rate of 10 per cent.
Estimation of the opportunity 
costs (BAU incomes) of ceasing 
logging from 2012
The total of the present value of oppor-
tunity costs—in terms of government tax 
receipts, landowner royalties, landowner 
development benefits, and profits to logging 
companies forgone—is in Equation 3. The 
present value of opportunity cost in terms of 
exports is in Equation 4. The present value 
of opportunity cost per tonne of carbon 
dioxide emitted is in Equation 5, defined as 
the sum of the discounted costs from Equa-
tion 3 divided by the discounted tonnage of 
carbon dioxide emissions abated.
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is in Equation 8, which is the sum of the 
discounted costs from Equation 6 divided 
by the discounted tonnage of carbon dioxide 
emissions abated.
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New variables are defined as: CP = palm-
oil company net profits; S = smallholder net 
profits; T = government income tax receipts; 
EIP = export income opportunity cost for 
palm-oil. 
In the case of log and palm-oil exports, 
Papua New Guinea is a price taker, but no 
account has been taken of commodity price 
increases resulting from global efforts to halt 
deforestation. Another uncertainty is the 
effect of the massive liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) project and other resource projects 
that will increase foreign currency inflows 
and, eventually, tax revenues. Avoidance of 
‘Dutch disease’ from kina appreciation that 
will reduce the incomes from logs and palm-
oil could require the saving of revenues in 
an offshore trust fund (ACIL Tasman 2009; 
PNG Department of Treasury and Finance 
2009).
In the event of a cessation of or reduc-
tion in logging and oil-palm, the incomes of 
landowners will diminish. Landowners can 
be expected to compensate for a reduction 
in their incomes by increasing subsistence 
agriculture (ITS Global 2009 also suggests 
that subsistence agriculture will increase). 
They will likely do this by intensifying 
production or shortening their rotations (see 
Bourke and Harwood 2009 for a discussion 
of food-crop production increases in Papua 
New Guinea).
Moreover, biodiversity could increase, 
and this could lead to enhanced benefits 
from eco-tourism. It was impossible, how-
ever, to estimate the extent and value of 
these alternative income sources within 
the scope of this article. Given that the 
income with REDD is assumed to be zero, 
the opportunity cost is set equal to BAU 
income.
In estimating the future stream of 
income from logging, it is necessary to take 
into account market conditions for raw logs 
and the future availability of the resource 
to logging companies. The market for raw 
logs has been impacted since mid 2008 by 
the global financial crisis, but PNG produc-
tion under a BAU scenario is expected to 
recover and plateau at almost 3 million cu 
m. In making this forecast, forest industry 
personnel were consulted (Personal com-
munication, Bob Tate, executive officer, 
Forest Industries Association Incorporated, 
and members of the PNGFIA board, Decem-
ber 2009) for their views. The consensus 
was that because of the increasing costs of 
logging and diminishing profitability, the 
volume of log exports is likely to recover 
but only to a modest degree—similar to 
that modelled in Figure 1, where the dip in 
exports in 2008 and 2009 is due to the global 
financial crisis. In this ‘medium’ projection, 
2.5 million cu m of raw logs is extracted for 
export and 500,000 cu m is for domestic 
processing. In assessing opportunity costs, 
a sensitivity analysis was conducted with 
income from export logs also at ‘high’ and 
‘low’ levels. A REDD scheme is assumed 
to be designed to reduce the export of raw 
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logs but not the production of logs for the 
domestic market; a reduction in the latter 
would have greater consequences for 
employment and affect the supply of timber 
in the domestic market. 
The free-on-board (FOB) value of 
export logs and the shares of this income 
to stakeholders, logging companies, land-
owners and government—both historically 
and under a BAU scenario—together 
with the value of processed product, are 
calculated (Figure 2) (please contact the 
author at c.hunt@uq.edu.au for actual and 
projected stakeholder incomes). While this 
analysis includes the log export tax, it does 
not include income tax paid by logging 
companies—their annual accounts being 
publicly unavailable. The logging company 
share in Figure 2 is the difference between 
total receipts and landowner receipts plus 
government receipts.
The compulsory levies that apply to log 
exports, which determine the shares of log 
export income to government, landowners 
and logging companies, are complex, and 
are summarised in Appendix 1.
Despite the compulsory nature of export 
levies, establishment of the benefits received 
by landowners from the exploitation of their 
forest resources is made difficult by the nego-
tiability of the project development benefits 
(PDBs)—both in respect to the proportion of 
cash and project funds and to the degree to 
which permit holders make cash payments 
as a supplement to or as a substitute for proj-
ect funds. The Review Team (2004) estimated 
that the total value of landowner benefits in 
operational logging projects was K26/cu m 
of log exports, which is only slightly above 
the royalty plus the PDB payment estimated 
by the author to be between K20/cu m and 
K23/cu m for the years 2002–04.
Figure 1 Volume of raw logs exported and processed, actual to 2008, medium BAU 
projected to 2025
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Sources: Raw log exports actual—Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG), Various years. Quarterly Economic 
Bulletin, Bank of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby; processing—Papua New Guinea Forest Industries 
Association (PNGFIA), n.d. Key Indicators 1992–1994, Papua New Guinea Forest Industries Association, Port 
Moresby. Available from http://www.fiapng.com/forest_sector.html (accessed October 2009); Papua New 
Guinea Forest Authority (PNGFA), 2007. Papua New Guinea Forest Authority 2006 Annual Report, Papua New 
Guinea Forest Authority, Port Moresby; BAU projections-Colin Hunt.
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A conservative approach is taken to the 
estimation of the benefits received by land-
owners from the logging of natural forests. 
No allowance is made for in-kind and cash 
benefits over and above compulsory royalty 
and development levies; in other words, it 
is assumed that such benefits substitute for 
development levies.
Fox, Yosi and Keenan (2010) estimate 
that, on average, selectively harvested 
forest has 75t C/ha less aboveground live 
biomass than primary forest immediately 
after harvesting.5 The Fox, Yosi and Keenan 
(2010) model of carbon dioxide (the main 
greenhouse gas) emissions takes account 
of not only the removal of biomass in the 
form of logs but also the carbon dioxide 
emitted by the decomposition of small wood 
and large wood resulting from collateral 
damage, emissions from timber harvesting 
and transport operations, together with 
the rate of carbon sequestration in areas of 
successful forest regeneration as well as the 
storage of carbon in wood products.
Actual and modelled abated emissions, 
under the medium BAU scenario, are in 
Figure 3. In 2019, emissions from BAU log-
ging reach 48.6 Mt of carbon dioxide (CO2). 
Figure 2 Income from raw log exports and domestic processing, actual to 2008, 
medium BAU projected to 2025
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Sources: Actual log export income—Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG), Various years. Quarterly Economic 
Bulletin, Bank of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. Landowner development levy and royalty to 2006—
Hunt, C., 2002b. ‘Efficient and equitable forest rent capture in three Pacific island nations: opportunities and 
impediments in forest policy reform’, Small-Scale Forest Economics, Management and Policy, 1(1):Table 4; Hunt, 
C., 2006. An economic assessment of present and alternative arrangements for the management of PNG forests, 
Unpublished report:Table 2; Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (PNGFA), 2007. Papua New Guinea Forest 
Authority 2006 Annual Report, Papua New Guinea Forest Authority, Port Moresby:23; Papua New Guinea 
Forest Industries Association (PNGFIA), 2007. PNG forest sector—an overview, Presentation by R. Tate to the 
42nd meeting of the International Tropical Timber Council, Port Moresby. Landowner development levy and 
royalty 2007 and 2008 estimation based on legislated levy and royalty. Processed products—Bank of Papua New 
Guinea (BPNG), Various years. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Bank of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby; Papua 
New Guinea Forest Industries Association (PNGFIA), 2007. PNG forest sector—an overview, Presentation by 
R. Tate to the 42nd meeting of the International Tropical Timber Council, Port Moresby; Papua New Guinea 
Forest Industries Association (PNGFIA), n.d. Key Indicators 1992–1994, Papua New Guinea Forest Industries 
Association, Port Moresby. Available from http://www.fiapng.com/forest_sector.html (accessed October 2009); 
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (PNGFA), 2007. Papua New Guinea Forest Authority 2006 Annual Report, 
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority, Port Moresby; BAU projections-Colin Hunt.
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With a cessation in logging in 2012, however, 
the emissions are –10.5 Mt due to sequestra-
tion in the previously logged forest. The net 
result in terms of abatement is thus 59.1 Mt. 
The slowly increasing abatement from 2012 
is due to the time lag in the release of carbon 
from forest damaged during logging.
Emissions abated under the ‘high’, 
‘medium’ and ‘low’ projections for log 
volumes and prices are provided (Figure 
4); the potential abatement accompanying 
the ‘high’ projection stops after 2023 as 
merchantable logs are exhausted. In con-
trast, abatement potential under the ‘low’ 
projection continues to 2028.
The PNG government benefits from log 
taxes, while landowners benefit directly 
from royalties and indirectly from develop-
ment funds set aside from export revenues 
(based on the volume and FOB value of 
logs). The benefits to logging companies are 
their net profits earned after income tax. But 
because annual reports of the 20 or so mainly 
foreign-based logging companies are not 
publicly accessible, profits are assumed to be 
30 per cent of gross incomes, which, it is sug-
gested, is the required return in a high-risk 
environment such as Papua New Guinea.6 It 
is likely that the compensation paid to log-
ging companies would be based on expected 
profits from concessions awarded by the 
government. In this analysis, it is assumed 
that concessions are continually allocated 
until the merchantable logs are exhausted 
in 2025 under the ‘medium’ projection, in 
2023 under the ‘high’ projection, and in 
‘2028’ under the low projection. Financial 
modelling is for the same periods.
The World Bank (2007) emphasised the 
positive livelihood benefits of improved 
rural road infrastructure. The economic 
and social benefits to landowners of infra-
structure associated with log harvesting and 
processing are not confined to roads. Bridges 
and culverts, airstrips, urban development 
and forestry plantations created by logging 
companies are also important. An audit of 49 
logging projects by Groome Poyry (1998:33) 
confirmed that 30 had delivered infrastruc-
ture that qualified as a credit against the 
required payment of project development 
levies, worth a total of K43 million.
While rural roads have poverty-reduction 
benefits (Hughes 2005), logging roads typi-
cally have a limited life, given that bridges 
are only temporary structures and the post-
logging maintenance necessary to keep dirt 
roads functional—especially in undulating 
country with high rainfall—is absent. The 
Wawoi Guavi project in Western Province, 
where Rimbunan Hijau has two timber-
processing plants, Panakawa and Kamusie, 
is one of the few examples where the timber 
industry can claim to provide relatively 
enduring regional infrastructure, including 
roads, airfields, wharves, air services, health 
clinics and schools (ITS Global 2006). In this 
article, however, logging for processing is 
excluded and only the implications for emis-
sions from export logging are dealt with.
In estimating opportunity costs, it is 
unlikely that there would be a cessation in 
logging before 2012 under REDD, given that 
arrangements would need to be in place, not 
only for compensation for government and 
landowner revenues and logging company 
profits forgone, but also for REDD-plus 
monitoring, reporting and verification.
Results for opportunity costs of 
ceasing logging
The quantity of emissions abated is 674 Mt 
CO2 for the ‘medium’ projection and the 
average annual abatement is 35.5 Mt CO2. 
Results for the ‘high’ and ‘low’ projections 
are also calculated (Table 1). The present 
value of opportunity costs for stakeholders 
for the ‘medium’ projection are US$188 
million for loggers, US$224 million for 
landowners, and US$228 million for the 
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Figure 3 Emissions BAU and with REDD, medium projections
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Figure 4 Potential abatement from export logging
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national government. The present value 
of the opportunity costs in terms of export 
income is US$1.081 billion. The range of 
opportunity costs for the three levels of 
projections is in Table 2. The opportunity 
cost of emissions abated in terms of export 
income forgone is US$4.54/t CO2, ranging 
from US$5.64 to US$3.40 with a ‘medium’ 
estimate of US$4.54.
Opportunity costs of ceasing new 
oil-palm establishment
The quantity of emissions abated for this sce-
nario ranges from 45.4 to 113 Mt CO2 (Table 
3). The opportunity cost to smallholders at 
the ‘medium’ projection is US$77 million, 
for companies it is US$179 million, and for 
government it is US$104 million, while the 
opportunity cost in terms of palm-oil export 
income forgone is US$714 million. The cost 
per tonne of abatement in the ‘medium’ 
projection for export income is US$40/t CO2 
with a ‘medium’ estimate of US$81.9 Mt.
Results are sensitive to the price of palm-
oil. A range above and below the World Bank 
(2009a) price forecast varies the opportunity 
costs by plus or minus 10 per cent (Table 4). 
The cost per tonne of carbon dioxide from 
palm-oil could be below these estimates if 
the industry reduces its carbon footprint by 
establishing one-third of new oil-palm plan-
tations on already cleared land (Personal 
communication, Ian Orrell, director, PNG 
Oil Palm Research Association).
The production of fresh-fruit bunches 
is by company plantations surrounded 
by smallholders. Company mills—at the 
operational centres of the nucleus estates—
process production from the estate and the 
peripheral smallholder plantations. The 
area of oil-palm and the export value of 
palm-oil—actual and projected—for Papua 
New Guinea can be mapped (Figures 5 and 
6). Expansion of the industry is expected 
to continue, given the continuing strong 
demand for palm-oil and palm-oil prod-
ucts.
The annual reports for only one of the 
five companies producing palm-oil in Papua 
New Guinea, New Britain Palm Oil Limited 
(2008), were publicly available; the annual 
reports of the four other companies—three 
owned at the time of writing by Minneapo-
lis-based Cargill—were not accessible. New 
Britain Palm Oil was, however, responsible 
for one-half of Papua New Guinea’s output 
and exports. Output, income, government 
tax and expenditure by the four Papua New 
Guinea-based palm-oil companies can thus 
be estimated with a reasonable level of 
confidence. As for logging companies, the 
profits of smallholders—which are the basis 
for compensation—are estimated at 30 per 
cent of gross income.
The emissions from oil-palm and the 
abatement achieved by cessation of the 
establishment of new plantations from 2012 
can be calculated (Figure 7), as can be the 
nominal values of the opportunity costs 
and the incidence of costs (Figure 8). Actual 
company net incomes and smallholder gross 
incomes are derived from company annual 
accounts and are projected in proportion to 
the expansion projected in Figures 5 and 6.
The palm-oil companies provide sub-
stantial infrastructure and social benefits 
in the regions in which they are located. A 
tax credit is available to the companies for 
approved expenditure on infrastructure; 
New Britain Palm Oil spent K5.7 million 
on roads in 2008 under this scheme. In 
addition, the companies are important 
providers of education infrastructure and 
services, as well as public buildings such 
as police stations and staffed health centres 
(BSi Management Systems 2008:35). New 
Britain Palm Oil provides health care for 
26,000 people and had total enrolment in 
its schools of 2,621 in 2008 (New Britain 
Palm Oil Limited 2008:22, 24). It has not, 
76
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Table 1 Quantity of carbon dioxide emissions abated by cessation of export logging in 
2012, at ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ projections for the rate of logging (Mt)
High Medium Low
Total 788 674 658
Average per annum  41.5  35.5  34.6
Source: Fox, J., Yosi, C. and Keenan, R., 2010. Estimating CO2 emissions associated with selective timber 
harvesting and oil palm conversion in Papua New Guinea, Unpublished report and spreadsheets, University of 
Melbourne, Vic using BAU projections by Colin Hunt.
Table 2 Projections of income forgone (present value) by cessation of export logging in 
2012 (US$ million)
High Medium Low
Logger net income 255 188 129
Landowner royalty 69 65 58
Landowner development benefit 188 159 93
Government 295 228 156
Export income 1400 1081 735
Note: Stakeholder shares of export income are determined by regulations and legislation and applied to BAU 
projections by Colin Hunt.
Table 3 Quantity of carbon dioxide emissions abated by cessation of conversion to oil-
palm, 2012–37 (Mt)
High Medium Low
Total 113.0 81.9 45.4
Average per annum 4.0 2.9 1.6
Source: Fox, J., Yosi, C. and Keenan, R., 2010. Estimating CO2 emissions associated with selective timber 
harvesting and oil palm conversion in Papua New Guinea, Unpublished report and spreadsheets, University of 
Melbourne, Vic using BAU projections by Colin Hunt.
Table 4 Projections of income forgone (present value) per tonne of carbon dioxide 
abated by cessation of oil-palm establishment in 2012 (US$ million)
High Medium Low
Smallholders (net income) 85 77 69
Companies (net income) 197 179 161
Government tax 115 104 94
Export income 784 714 643
Sources: Stakeholder incomes and government tax are based on New Britain Palm Oil Limited, 2008. Annual 
Report of New Britain Palm Oil 2008, New Britain Palm Oil Limited, Kimbe, 
West New Britain. Available from http://www.nbpol.com.pg/downloads/Annual_Report_2008_FINAL.pdf 
(accessed 15 October 2009). BAU projections by Colin Hunt.
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Figure 5 Area of oil-palm, actual to 2008, BAU projected to 2037
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Figure 6 Value of palm-oil exports, actual to 2008, BAU projected to 2037
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Figure 7 Carbon dioxide emissions from oil-palm, actual to 2008, medium BAU 
projected to 2037 and abated from 2012
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Figure 8 Opportunity costs of cessation in expansion of oil-palm, 2012–37,  
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however, been possible in the scope of 
this article to quantify the annual financial 
contribution of PNG palm-oil companies to 
social infrastructure.
The expansion of oil-palm forecast in 
this article does not include proposed so-
called agro-forestry projects. Their status 
is uncertain, given that most projects are 
for oil-palm but are located where there 
is no mill infrastructure and are therefore 
unlikely to proceed.7
Regional economic impacts and 
socioeconomic costs of REDD
New Britain Palm Oil Limited’s (2008) 
expenditure on goods (including the pur-
chase of the output of smallholders) and 
services and wages was US$168 million in 
2008, and, from 2004 to 2008, it averaged 
three times the level of net profits. Therefore, 
total expenditure on goods and services by 
palm-oil companies is likely to have been 
in the region of US$300 million in 2008. A 
proportion of this expenditure would be 
on imports; but a proportion would also be 
made directly at the regional level (on wages, 
fresh fruit, repairs and maintenance, trans-
port, and so on), resulting in an economic 
impact. The regional benefits of palm-oil 
are thus larger than indicated simply by the 
size of palm-oil company profits. Logging 
company expenditure at the regional level 
will also have an economic impact—albeit 
less than that of palm-oil companies given 
the transitory nature of logging—but this 
impact cannot be illustrated due to the 
unavailability of logging company annual 
accounts.
The employment impact of a cessa-
tion in logging in Papua New Guinea is 
illustrated by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO 2005) estimate that 8,000 
workers at any one time receive monetary 
benefits through the provision of labour to 
logging companies. In the case of the palm-
oil industry, there were almost 14,000 PNG 
nationals employed in 2008, as well as 52,000 
smallholders involved in supplying the 
mills (Personal communication, Ian Orrell, 
director, PNG Oil Palm Research Asso-
ciation). An illustration of the social costs 
incurred by the cessation of new oil-palm 
plantings in 2012 is the forecast that the loss 
in employment for PNG nationals would 
peak at 4,000 and the loss in smallholder 
gross receipts would peak at more than 
US$70 million as a result (Figure 9). (please 
contact the author at c.hunt@uq.edu.au for 
projections.) Oil-palm takes a few years to 
become productive after establishment, 
hence the sigmoid curves representing gross 
income and employment forgone from 2012 
in Figure 9. (No estimate is made for the 
increase in the number of smallholders, as 
this will depend on the expansion in area 
planted by existing smallholders.)
The majority—87 per cent (Bourke and 
Harwood 2009)—of the PNG population is 
rural and the rate of population growth is 
2.4 per cent (World Bank 2010), implying 
a doubling of the population in 30 years. 
Demand for land for cash cropping such 
as oil-palm and subsistence agriculture is 
bound to increase. There is a danger that the 
preservation of large areas of forest could 
impede cash generation and the mainte-
nance of livelihoods. To avoid such perverse 
outcomes, the regional implications of the 
REDD scheme need to be investigated.
Issues in compensation
The PNG government must be concerned 
that compensation is paid at a level that 
generates at least a similar level of national 
income and livelihoods to that forgone 
(Pagiola and Bosquet 2009). The adminis-
tration of a REDD scheme in Papua New 
Guinea faces particular challenges in the 
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negotiation of compensation that is equita-
ble for the customary owners of the forest 
resource. While REDD needs to be coor-
dinated nationally to avoid inter-regional 
leakage in emissions, funding could be 
either through the national government or 
channelled directly to regions. Up to now, 
a policy vacuum has allowed unscrupulous 
carbon traders to exploit the naiveté of land-
owners (Mellick 2010). The task faced is the 
effective distribution of the funds or making 
investments on behalf of landowners. It is 
estimated that logging will generate US$11 
million in royalties and US$26 million in 
PDBs in 2012 (see Figure 2 and Appendix 1 
for compulsory levies and supplementary 
information about their projections). In the 
case of PDBs, funds are set aside by the PNG 
Forest Authority (PNGFA) and administered 
by committees; but this has proved to be an 
ineffective vehicle for regional development 
(Filer 2009). It should be emphasised that 
the forest resource in each incorporated 
landowner group (ILG) is logged out in 
one or two years, so that the cash benefits 
through royalties are temporary. There is a 
limited range of investment opportunities 
locally, and the absence of local banking 
services hampers household and collective 
community investment and savings. Much 
of the money received is spent in a way that 
produces little visible long-term benefit, and 
spin-off businesses die when the project 
they rely on is completed (PNGFIA 2007). 
An effective model needs to be developed 
for the deployment of REDD funds.
The nature of the infrastructure benefits 
of logging was discussed earlier. Lack of 
information on infrastructure inventories 
and values precludes the inclusion of the 
opportunity costs of infrastructure associated 
with logging and oil-palm in this analysis. 
Nevertheless, in practice, a premium could 
be paid to landowners—over and above roy-
alty and development levies—to compensate 
for infrastructure forgone.
Given that forest resources and land 
converted from forest will be out of bounds 
after the cessation of logging under REDD, 
the availability of regional investment 
alternatives is unclear. Rather than invest 
in REDD compensation funds that might 
not be successful, an alternative is for the 
REDD scheme to pay landowners annuities 
Figure 9 Projections of employment and nominal value of smallholder gross income 
forgone with cessation in conversion to oil-palm, 2012–37
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in cash and allow them to make their own 
investment decisions. But cash annuities 
in small amounts—in contrast with log 
royalties, which come in a lump sum—are 
more likely to be consumed than saved and 
invested. But, as ITS Global (2009) points 
out, it is unrealistic to expect landowners to 
be able to assess the long-term opportunity 
costs of REDD. This again highlights the 
need for regional studies of development 
opportunities and delivery mechanisms 
under a REDD scheme.
Another difficult issue that needs to be 
resolved is the scheduling of landowner 
compensation. Landowners in conces-
sions soon to be logged under BAU could 
expect compensation in the near term for 
royalties and development benefits forgone. 
For future logging, however, there is the 
difficulty of forecasting when particular 
concessions will be opened and the pattern 
of logging within them, and consequently 
when landowners whose trees are felled 
would be entitled to compensation. To over-
come this problem, as well as the problem 
of a decline in the real value of royalties 
and development benefits over time due 
to inflation, all landowners could receive 
compensation under a negotiated settle-
ment at the commencement of the scheme. 
Such up-front payments of compensation 
would, however, conflict with the need 
for the donor to be satisfied that promised 
abatement was achieved in each year.
As well as difficulties of timing, there 
are also risks in the administration of REDD 
funds—broadly illustrated by the ranking 
of Papua New Guinea at 154 out of 180 
countries in the Transparency International 
(2009) corruption index; and a ranking 
of 10—where 1 is low control and 100 is 
high—in the World Bank (2009b) control-
of-corruption index.
The risk that surrounds the deployment 
of REDD funds for the benefit of landowners 
is illustrated by a case of misappropriation 
or faulty accounting with respect to the 
landowner development funds sourced 
from log export revenues. The Post-Courier 
(‘K4 mil. forest levies unaccounted for’, 
29 September 2009) reported that the Gulf 
provincial government had failed to account 
for some K2.6 million received in log export 
development levies in 2007 and K2.1 million 
received in 2008 from five projects.
The obvious risks to potential donors of 
investing in REDD in Papua New Guinea 
are likely to weigh heavily on donor deci-
sions. As ITS Global (2009) points out, a 
slump in the price per tonne of carbon, in the 
absence of binding emission targets post-
Copenhagen, is also likely to have affected 
the price REDD donors are willing to pay for 
sequestered carbon in PNG. A risk discount 
applied to the price for carbon emissions 
abated that reduced compensation below 
opportunity costs would probably not be 
well received by PNG stakeholders. In 
making their REDD investment decisions, 
donors are likely to compare the risk across 
countries and invest where the carbon price 
and risk are relatively low.
Baselines and moral hazard
Tropical developing countries will be 
tempted to inflate their BAU projections 
of deforestation in order to maximise their 
compensation. A case of this seems to exist 
in Papua New Guinea. In its ‘preliminary 
inscription’, forwarded to the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change under 
the Copenhagen Accord, Papua New Guinea 
claims that carbon dioxide emissions from 
forestry are estimated to be 50–52 Mt in 2010, 
that these will increase to 53–64 Mt by 2030, 
and that the abatement that can be delivered 
by 2030 is 50 per cent of this volume—that 
is, 26–32 Mt. Agriculture is also expected to 
expand greatly, creating a large abatement 
potential of 15–27 Mt/pa by 2030 (Conrad 
2010:4).
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While present emissions from export 
logging are estimated to be 48 Mt (Fox, Yosi 
and Keenan 2010)—which is roughly in line 
with the government’s figure—the increase 
to 2030 from logging suggested by the PNG 
government is unrealistic, given that, as 
discussed, the accessible resource could be 
exhausted several years before that time at 
current rates of exploitation.
The proposition that emissions from 
subsistence agriculture can form part of the 
large abatement has already been discussed. 
First, subsistence agriculture is already 
efficient and, second, the government has 
no control over subsistence agriculturalists 
tilling their own land. No accurate emis-
sion data exist for the bulk of commercial 
and smallholder agricultural production, 
with the exception of oil-palm, which, by 
far the fastest growing agricultural crop, 
still generates total emissions of only 3.85 
Mt CO2 by 2030 (Figure 7). Up to one-third 
of new plantings could be expected to be 
accommodated on already cleared land, 
which delivers the limited abatement of 
1.28 Mt CO2. The abatement potential from 
agriculture would thus seem to be a good 
deal less than the 15–27 Mt claimed by the 
PNG government.
Conclusions
This study confirms the view of Howes 
(2009) that for Papua New Guinea the 
reduction in greenhouse emissions from 
land-use change and forestry (LUCF) will 
be cheap—at least in the case of logging for 
export—but will not be easy. These conclu-
sions are reached through the application of 
financial modelling and by integrating the 
results with the results of recent research 
on carbon dioxide emissions generated by 
the selective logging of primary forest and 
from growing oil-palm that replaces selec-
tively logged forest. Modelling of industries 
enables the estimation of the present value 
of BAU stakeholder and export incomes, as 
well as the BAU value per tonne of carbon 
dioxide emissions abated. In the case of log-
ging, the forecasts are for 2012 to 2023–28,8 
and, in the case of palm-oil, for 2012–37. It 
should be noted that cost estimates do not 
include the costs of administering REDD.
A criticism of the method is that the 
opportunity costs of REDD have been 
overestimated to the extent that income 
generated by enterprises that might replace 
logging and palm-oil have been ignored. 
Other sources of error are the estimations 
of the profits of logging companies. The 
omission of income tax paid by logging 
companies—which inflates logging 
company profits and deflates government 
tax receipts by an equal amount—was 
forced on the analysis by lack of data. 
The PNG government will have access to 
logging company income tax returns and 
will be able to better estimate profits.
Export incomes to Papua New Guinea 
under BAU, and hence the opportunity 
costs of REDD, could also change relative to 
the projections made in this article; export 
incomes could increase as a result of a 
reduction in worldwide deforestation rates, 
or decrease as a result of the appreciation of 
the kina relative to the US dollar.
There is also overstatement of the abate-
ment achieved by REDD due to the variable 
rates of sequestration in regenerating forest 
of different age classes. The method of 
analysis, however, minimises this error.9 At 
the same time, the exclusion of the value of 
infrastructure benefits provided by logging 
and palm-oil companies underestimates 
opportunity costs.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of the 
analysis, it can be concluded that it appears 
feasible to design a compensation package 
for REDD in the case of logging based on 
BAU incomes. In contrast, in the case of oil-
palm, stakeholder and national opportunity 
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costs are sufficiently high to rule out REDD 
as an economical option, unless there is a 
marked rise in the international prices paid 
for carbon dioxide emissions abated. While 
the opportunity cost of REDD in the case of 
logging will likely be higher than hitherto 
suggested,10 its price is still what could be 
considered ‘reasonable’ and it delivers a 
large quantity of abatement.
The amount of compensation varies 
between stakeholders depending on the 
nature of the benefit—that is, shares of export 
income for government and landowners, 
based on legislation and regulation, and net 
profit in the case of logging companies. Given 
that a donor would want proof of abatement, 
it would be best that compensation is paid 
annually. These payments compensating 
for opportunity costs (under the ‘medium’ 
projection of BAU incomes) would average 
US$214 million per annum in nominal 
terms for the years 2012–25 and total 
US$2.790 billion, which has a present 
value of US$1.081 billion (at a 10 per cent 
discount rate) (please contact the author 
at c.hunt@uq.edu.au for the projections of 
BAU incomes).
It is clear that enormous challenges face 
Papua New Guinea in the design of manage-
ment arrangements that effectively deliver 
REDD compensation, particularly in the 
case of payments to the customary landown-
ers. Donors would need to be satisfied that 
REDD compensation was indeed enhancing 
rather than disadvantaging the welfare 
of regional communities and that funds 
were being used wisely. Further research 
is needed to identify the mechanisms by 
which compensation payments could be 
made equitably and in a way that would 
benefit communities and the economy more 
generally. This could extend the planning 
time required for REDD beyond the period 
envisaged in this article. 
Appendix 1: Compulsory levies 
on export logs
Royalties 
Paid to landowners on whose land the 
trees were felled, at a fixed rate for each 
species and thus varying with the species 
mix being harvested. It is estimated that the 
Papua New Guinea-wide payment averages 
K13.86/cu m before allowing for a govern-
ment withholding tax of 5 per cent (Personal 
communication, Bob Tate, executive officer, 
PNGFIA). Changes can be made by ministe-
rial notice to each permit holder.
Project development benefit (PDB) 
A progressive levy based on free-on-board 
(FOB) values. The levy is collected by the 
National Forest Service and distributed on 
the basis of outcomes of the responsible 
committees, with the proportions of cash 
and development funds negotiable. The 
PDB replaced the producer development 
levy that specified the proportions of cash 
and development funds payable.
Log export development levy 
A flat tax at K8/cu m exported (plantation 
logs exempt). Administered by central 
government agencies and distributed on the 
basis of proposals submitted by provincial 
and local area governments (Forestry [2007 
Budget Amendment] Act 2006, of the Forestry 
Act 1991:s. 121A, Log Export Development 
Levy.)
Log export tax 
A flat rate of 28.5 per cent of FOB values 
(plantation logs exempt) (Customs Tariff 
[2007 Budget Amendment] Act 2006:s. 3).
Reforestation levy 
An amount of K2/cu m raised by the PNG 
Forest Authority (PNGFA). Previously, 60 
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per cent was applied to the project area and 
40 per cent to PNGFA-owned plantations, 
but its allocation is now at the discretion of 
the PNGFA.
Agricultural and ‘other’ levies 
Negotiated at project commencement and 
dispersed by provincial governments.
Notes
1 More recent estimates are that deforestation 
and degradation generate about 12 per cent 
of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions 
(Le Quéré et al. 2009). 
2 The underpinning principles of REDD-plus 
are detailed at The Forests Dialogue (2010). 
A market approach to REDD requires that 
1 tonne of carbon dioxide abated by forest 
conservation equates to 1 tonne abated by 
all other means. Given the idiosyncrasies 
of forests, this will be difficult to guarantee; 
therefore, a funds-based approach is more 
appropriate until the problems of abatement 
by REDD—in terms of monitoring, verification 
and reporting—are solved (Hunt 2009).
3 This level of aboveground carbon is lower 
than estimates for equivalent forests in 
Southeast Asia, where estimates are for 
240–60 t/ha (Fox et al. 2010:6).
4 Harvesting is selective in that logging 
companies concentrate on removing high-
value species with diameters greater than 50 
cm.
5 One tonne of C = 3.67 tonnes of CO2.
6 The income tax on profits has not been 
established; this estimate of net profit is 
therefore before tax.
7 Special agricultural and business leases (also 
called agro-forestry projects) have recently 
been granted to private companies that have 
a combined area of 1.5 million ha and are 
mostly not already logged (Filer 2009:23–5). 
Such projects require infrastructure. In the 
case of oil-palm development, the need 
is for a palm-oil mill in proximity to the 
plantations—necessitating a very large 
investment. Nevertheless, as Filer (2009) 
points out, if two or three of these projects 
evolve into large-scale developments, the 
prospect is for even higher growth than has 
been forecast in this article.
8 While logging ceases in 2025 under the 
‘medium’ projection, it ceases earlier (in 2023) 
in the case of the ‘high’ projection and later 
(in 2028) in the case of the ‘low’ projection, 
given that the finite resource is exploited at 
differential rates.
9 The modelling assumes that there is no 
abatement benefit after the logs are exhausted. 
Re-growth is, however, still sequestering 
carbon 100 years after logging and the rate 
of carbon sequestration is not constant 
over time; sequestration exhibits a sigmoid 
tendency with faster rates from five to 20 
years after logging (Fox, Yosi and Keenan 
2010). After the end of the modelling period 
(2025, in the case of the ‘medium’ projection), 
the sequestration rate will be higher in 
forest logged under BAU than for forest 
last logged in 2011 under REDD. While the 
abatement benefit of REDD is overstated, the 
discounting method adopted in calculating 
the cost per tonne gives abatement in the 
future a lesser value than abatement in the 
present, thus the error is minimised. 
10 Grieg Gran (2006), in a report to Stern (2006), 
estimated the opportunity costs of a cessation 
in logging in Papua New Guinea at US$5/t 
CO2 abated; Busch et al. (2009) suggested 
a cost of US$2.24/t CO2 for Papua New 
Guinea, while a survey by Olsen and Bishop 
(2008) found the financial cost of logging in 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific to be US$3.44/t 
CO2, and Boucher (2008) found a similar level 
of average cost of US$2.90/t CO2. Previously 
inflated data on carbon emissions from PNG 
LUCF (WRI 2009) could have resulted in 
these low costs. These estimates should also 
be treated with caution because the method 
adopted has a large bearing on cost (Richards 
and Stokes 2004).
comPEnsatinG for tHE costs of rEducinG dEforEstation in PaPua nEw GuinEa
85
References
ACIL Tasman, 2009. PNG LNG Economic 
Impact Study, ACIL Tasman, 
Melbourne.
Allen, B., Bourke, R. and Hanson, L. 
2001. ‘Dimensions of PNG village 
agriculture’, in M. Bourke, M. Allen 
and J. Salisbury (eds), Food Security for 
Papua New Guinea: proceedings of the 
Papua New Guinea Food and Nutrition 
2000 Conference, Australian Centre for 
International Agricultural Research, 
Canberra.
Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG), 
Various years. Quarterly Economic 
Bulletin, Bank of Papua New Guinea, 
Port Moresby.
Boucher, D. 2008. Out of the Woods: a 
realistic role for tropical forests in curbing 
global warming, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, UCS Publications, 
Cambridge, Mass.
Bourke, R. and Harwood T., 2009. Food 
and Agriculture in Papua New Guinea, 
ANU E Press, Canberra. Available 
from http://epress.anu.edu.au/food_
agriculture/pdf_instructions.html 
(accessed 4 July 2010).
Bryan, J., Shearman, P., Ash, J. and 
Kirkpatrick J., (forthcoming). 
‘Estimating rainforest biomass stocks 
and carbon loss from deforestation and 
degradation’, Journal of Environmental 
Management, doi:10.1016/j.
jenvman.2009.12.006.
BSi Management Systems, 2008. Hargy Oil 
Palm Limited—initial RSPO certification 
assessment, BSi Management Systems, 
Singapore.
Busch, J., Strassburg, B., Cattaneo, A., 
Lubowski, R., Boltz, F., Ashton, R., 
Bruner, A. and Rice, R., 2009. Open 
Source Impacts of REDD Incentives 
Spreadsheet (OSIRIS), March, 
Collaborative Modelling Initiative 
on REDD Economics, Conservation 
International, Norway.
Canadell, J., Le Quéré, C., Raupach, M., 
Field, C., Buitenhuis, E., Ciais, P., 
Conway, T., Gillett, N., Houghton, R. 
and Marland, G., 2007. ‘Contributions 
to accelerating atmospheric CO2 
growth from economic activity, carbon 
intensity, and efficiency of natural 
sinks’, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 104(47):18,866–70. 
Conrad, K., 2010. Papua New Guinea, 
Preliminary Inscription under the 
Copenhagen Accord, 2 February 2010, 
Department of Prime Minister and 
National Executive Council, Waigani. 
Available from http://unfccc.int/
files/meetings/application/pdf/
pngephaccord_app2.pdf (accessed 10 
August 2010).
Department of Treasury and Finance, 
(PNG) 2009. Final Budget Outcome 
2008, Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea, Waigani.
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 
2005. Global Forest Resources Assessment 
2005: Papua New Guinea country report, 
Food and Agriculture Organisation, 
Rome.
Filer, C., 2009. Drivers of deforestation 
and forest degradation in Papua New 
Guinea, Report for the Department 
of Environment and Conservation, 
Government of Papua New Guinea, 
Port Moresby.
Filer, C., Keenan, R., Allen, B. and 
McAlpine, J., 2009. ‘Deforestation 
and forest degradation in Papua 
New Guinea’, Annals of Forest Science, 
66:813–25.
Fox, J., Yosi, C. and Keenan, R., 2010. 
Estimating CO2 emissions associated 
86
Pacific Economic BullEtin
with selective timber harvesting and oil 
palm conversion in Papua New Guinea, 
Unpublished report and spreadsheets, 
University of Melbourne, Vic.
Fox, J., Yosi, C., Nimlago, P., Oavika, F., 
Pokana, J., Lavong, K. and Keenan, 
R., 2010. ‘Assessment of aboveground 
carbon in primary and selectively 
harvested tropical forest in Papua New 
Guinea’, Biotropica, 1:1–10. 
Grieg Gran, M., 2006. The costs of avoiding 
deforestation: report prepared for the Stern 
Review on the economics of climate change, 
International Institute for Environment 
and Development, London. 
Groome Poyry, 1998. Audit of landowner 
benefits received from harvesting 
operations under timber permit. Volume 1, 
Final report, Groome Poyry, Auckland.
Hepburn, C. and Koundouri, P., 2007. 
‘Recent advances in discounting: the 
implications for forest economics’, 
Journal of Forest Economics, 13:168–89.
Houghton, R., 2003. Data Note: emissions 
and sinks of carbon from land-use change, 
World Resources Institute, Washington, 
DC. Available from http://cait.wri.
org/downloads/DN-LUCF.pdf 
(accessed 14 October 2009). 
——, 2005. ‘Aboveground forest biomass 
and the global carbon balance’, Global 
Change Biology, 11:945–58.
Howes, S., 2009. ‘Cheap but not easy: the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
from deforestation and forest 
degradation in Papua New Guinea’, 
Pacific Economic Bulletin, 24(1):130–43.
Hughes, P., 2005. The difficult problem of 
measuring the village-level socio-economic 
benefits of road rehabilitation projects 
in rural Asia and Papua New Guinea, 
Resource Management in Asia-Pacific 
Working Paper No. 62, Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
The Australian National University, 
Canberra.
Hunt, C., 2002a. ‘Industrial harvesting: 
problems and proposals’, in C. Hunt 
(ed.), Production Privatisation and 
Preservation in Papua New Guinea 
Forestry, International Institute for 
Environment and Development, 
London. 
——, 2002b. ‘Efficient and equitable 
forest rent capture in three Pacific 
island nations: opportunities 
and impediments in forest policy 
reform’, Small-Scale Forest Economics, 
Management and Policy, 1(1):39–53.
——, 2006. An economic assessment of 
present and alternative arrangements 
for the management of PNG forests, 
Unpublished report.
——, 2009. Carbon Sinks and Climate 
Change: forests in the fight against global 
warming, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK. 
ITS Global, 2006. The economic importance 
of the forestry industry to Papua New 
Guinea, A report for the Rimbunan 
Hijau (PNG) Group, ITS Global, 
Melbourne. 
——, 2009. The Economic Benefits of Land-
Use in Papua New Guinea, ITS Global, 
Melbourne.
Keenan, R., Ambia, V., Brack, C., Frakes, I., 
Gerrand, A., Golman, M., Holznecht, 
H., Lavong, K., Sarn, N., Vanclay, J. and 
Yosi, C., 2005. Improved Timber Inventory 
and Strategic Forest Planning in Papua 
New Guinea, Bureau of Rural Sciences/
Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research, Canberra. 
Le Quéré, C., Raupach, M., Candell, J. 
and Marland, G., 2009. ‘Trends in the 
sources and sinks of carbon dioxide’, 
Nature Geoscience Focus, 2:831–6. 
comPEnsatinG for tHE costs of rEducinG dEforEstation in PaPua nEw GuinEa
87
Mellick, D.  2010. ‘Credibility of REDD and 
experiences from Papua New Guinea’,  
Conservation Biology, 24(2): 359-361.
Mollicone, D., Achard, F., Federici, S., Eva, 
D., Grassi, G., Belward, A., Raes, F., 
Seufert, G., Stibig, H.-G., Matteucci, G. 
and Schulz E.-D., 2007. ‘An incentive 
mechanism for reducing emissions 
from conversion of intact and non-
intact forests’, Climatic Change, 83:477–
93. 
New Britain Palm Oil Limited, 2008. 
Annual Report of New Britain Palm Oil 
2008, New Britain Palm Oil Limited, 
Kimbe, 
 West New Britain. Available from 
http://www.nbpol.com.pg/
downloads/Annual_Report_2008_
FINAL.pdf (accessed 15 October 2009).
Newell, R. and Pizer, W., 2003. 
‘Discounting the distant future: how 
much do uncertain rates increase 
valuations?’, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 46:52–71. 
Olsen, N. and Bishop, J., 2008. The 
Financial Costs of REDD, IUCN/
Rio Tinto, International Union for 
Conservation of Nature, Gland, 
Switzerland.
Pagiola, S. and Bosquet, B. 2009. 
Estimating the costs of REDD at the 
country level, MPRA Paper No. 1806, 
Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 
Munich University Library, Germany. 
Available from http://mrpa.ub.uni-
muenchende/18062/ (accessed 12 
November 2009). 
Pearce, D., 2003. ‘The social costs of 
carbon and its policy implications’, 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
(19)3:362–80.
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority 
(PNGFA), 1995. Logging Code of 
Practice, Papua New Guinea Forest 
Authority, Boroko. 
——, 2007. Papua New Guinea Forest 
Authority 2006 Annual Report, Papua 
New Guinea Forest Authority, Port 
Moresby.
Papua New Guinea Forest Industries 
Association (PNGFIA), 2007. 
PNG forest sector—an overview, 
Presentation by R. Tate to the 42nd 
meeting of the International Tropical 
Timber Council, Port Moresby
——, 2008. Submission to the Garnaut 
Review on the impact of an ETS on 
commercial forestry and development 
outcomes in PNG, Papua New Guinea 
Forest Industries Association, Port 
Moresby. 
——, n.d. Key Indicators 1992–1994, 
Papua New Guinea Forest Industries 
Association, Port Moresby. Available 
from http://www.fiapng.com/forest_
sector.html (accessed October 2009).
Review Team, 2004. Towards sustainable 
timber production—a review of 
existing logging projects, Final report, 
Government of Papua New Guinea, 
Waigani.
Richards, K. and Stokes, C., 2004. ‘A 
review of forest carbon sequestration 
cost studies: a dozen years of research’, 
Climatic Change, 63:1–48.
Santilli, M., Moutinho, P., Schwartzman, 
S., Nepstad, D., Curran, L. and Nobre, 
C., 2005. ‘Tropical deforestation and 
the Kyoto Protocol’, Climatic Change, 
71:267–76.
Shearman, P., Bryan, J., Ash, J., Mackey, 
B. and Lokes, B., 2009. The State of the 
Forests of Papua New Guinea. Mapping 
the extent and condition of forest cover 
and measuring the drivers of forest change 
in the period 1972–2002, University of 
Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. 
88
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Stern, N., 2006. The Economics of Climate 
Change, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
The Forests Dialogue, 2010. Investing in 
REDD-Plus, The Forests Dialogue, 
New Haven, Conn. Available from 
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/
investing_in_redd_plus_en_executive_
summary.pdf (accessed 1 February 
2020).
Transparency International, 2009. 
Indices, Transparency International, 
Berlin. Available from http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_
table (accessed 1 June 2010).
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2009. 
Copenhagen Accord, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Conference of the Parties, 
Copenhagen, 18 December. 
van der Werf, G., Morton, R., de Fries, J., 
Olivier, J., Kasibhatla, R., Jackson, R., 
Collatz, G. and Randerson, J., 2009. 
‘CO2 emissions from forest loss’, Nature 
Geoscience, Commentary, 2:737–9.
World Bank, 2007. Project paper on a proposed 
additional financing credit in the amount 
of SDR 24.90 million to the Independent 
State of Papua New Guinea for a road 
maintenance and rehabilitation project, The 
World Bank, Washington, DC. Available 
from http://www.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2007/04/09/000020953_200
70409085526/Rendered/PDF/39085.pdf
——, 2009a. Global Commodity Markets, The 
World Bank, Washington, DC.
——, 2009b. World-Wide Government 
Indicators 1996–2008, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
——, 2010. Data Profile: PNG, The 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Available from http://ddp-ext.
worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/
ViewSharedReport?REPORT_
ID=9147&REQUEST_
TYPE=VIEWADVANCED
World Resources Institute (WRI), 2009. 
Climate Analysis Indicator Tool (CAIT), 
Version 6, World Resources Institute, 
Washington, DC.
——, 2010. Climate Analysis Indicator Tool 
(CAIT), Version 7, World Resources 
Institute, Washington, DC. Available 
from http://cait.wri.org/cait.
php?page=yearly&mode=view
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Emeritus Professor 
Clem Tisdell and two anonymous referees 
for helpful comments. Any errors of fact 
or interpretation are, however, his sole 
responsibility.
